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 Chapter Eight 
The Justification of Punishment 
 
 
 The question of whether it is suitable to inflict punishment, and if so, to 
what degree, arises in all areas of legal inquiry, and beyond them, most 
notably in religion, philosophy and social science.  Punishment is generally 
defined as a painful or unpleasant consequence imposed on an offender for a 
breach of a legal rule.  A central feature of any concept of punishment is some 
form of identification of punishment with legitimate authority1.  Without this 
we are left with little more than private, random and retributive violence.  
Such legitimacy may rest upon various grounds amongst which a legal basis 
is of outstanding importance and may, substantively, take many forms.  
Legitimation in general and, more specifically, the legitimation of punishment 
are issues rooted in the historically most remote areas of intellectual inquiry; 
essentially the religious and philosophical struggles to give meaning to the 
potentially meaningless round of human existence.  Weber argues for a 
significant place for religious doctrines in the earliest formulations of this 
struggle to intellectualise and rationalise life; to wrest meaning from restless 
chaos2.  He points to a very general sense of merit or desert which, whilst 
                                                          
1 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1968, p5. 
2 H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology. London. Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 1948, p271. 
addressed by him to problems in religious thought, contain, I suggest, a tacit 
underpinning for theories of legitimation and of punishment. 
 
  In relation to inchoate offences, any attempt to justify current 
approaches in relation to punishment is, as these preliminary remarks 
suggest, but one aspect of a much larger concept.  However, while it would be 
possible to discuss the wider without reference to the narrower context, it is 
impossible to refer to any justification for the existence of inchoate offences 
without considering first the question of the justification of punishment in 
general.  In raising this question it is clear that everything cannot be covered.  
An analysis of the theological, philosophical, socio-political and historical 
legal approaches to punishment in general would be a work in its own right 
and beyond the scope of this study.  Whatever the merits, and they are 
considerable, of the history of ideas, too great emphasis upon this approach 
would direct the focus of this work away from criminal law. 
 
 If we accept these points, then it is reasonable to provide a brief 
framework of ideas, trends in thought and concepts within which approaches 
to punishment can be identified.  There is no completely satisfactory basis 
through which this identification can be organised.  Whether chronologically, 
individually or conceptually, all such organisational frameworks are to some 
degree arbitrary.  Choices have been made in the hope of drawing out those 
assumptions which have informed and built both long standing and 
contemporary views on the justification of punishment.  At the same time it 
has to be recognised that thinkers and ideas will surface in more than one 
section, however these sections are constructed. 
 
Punishment, Philosophy and Social Theory 
 
 As I have indicated in my opening remarks, the variety of approaches 
to the proper limits of punishment are as old as philosophical speculation 
itself.  Much of classical philosophy foreshadows subsequent, more 
developed and coherent theories which will be discussed later.  However, 
since these early philosophers did lay the foundations for later theorists, it 
will be useful to explore their ideas in brief.  The earliest significant attempt to 
explore the rationale for punishment began with the Sophists, who provide, 
in dramatic form, lengthy discussions of punishment, expressed firstly and 
forcefully in Aeschylus’ The Oresteia3.  What I find interesting about the trial4 
is the possibility of drawing out of it alternative strands which resonate 
through centuries of debate on punishment.  These alternatives are, on the 
one hand, divine punishment and, on the other, punishment as the outcome 
of procedure bearing some resemblance to ‘due process of law’.  Aeschylus’ 
work clearly marks the shifting emphasis in the justification of punishment.  
The debate over these respective rules of law was a characteristic of the 
                                                          
3 Aeschylus, The Oresteia. trans. G. Murray. London. Allen and Unwin. 1928.  
4 ibid., pp229-53. 
“Greek Enlightenment”5.  Protagoras felt that a rational infliction of 
punishment must proceed upon the hope of future deterrence of both the 
convicted and any witness, with improvement of the individual as the prime 
concern6.  This approach anticipates Benthamite utilitarianism and, in 
common with Socratic philosophy, would look for the course which resulted 
in the greatest degree of benefit7.  Plato’s argument took as its basis the 
notion that punishment was a way of restoring the divinely ordained nature 
of the universe.  He holds the purpose of punishment to be correction and 
deterrence8, but also as the medicine used to cure the wicked soul9.  
However where cure is impossible, it is seen as best for both the criminal and 
others that he be put to death as the ultimate deterrent10. 
                                                          
 
 
 A strong thesis in favour of the earthly origins of law and punishment 
appears amongst the younger Sophists, under which the legal system is used 
by governments to protect their own interests and punishment is visited upon 
those who infringe those interests.  The interests of those in power frame the 
law of the time - a view which is directly comparable with that of Marx who 
later argued that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling 
5 W. Windelband. A History of Philosophy. vol. I.1891. trans. J.H. Tufts. New York. Harper 
Row. 1958. pp72-6. 
6 von Bar, op. cit., pp381-2. 
7 ibid., p382. 
8 Plato. Gorgias. trans. F. Plaistowe. London. Clive. s32-3. Also J.M. Kelly. A Short History of 
Western Legal Theory. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1992, p31. 
ideas”11.  Moreover, this is a view which finds echoes in modern treatments 
of criminality and  punishment, especially in Foucault12. 
 
 Aristotle’s contribution to this field is seen by von Bar as unique13 as 
he distinguishes justification of punishment from the obligation to impose it.  
The justification for punishment is founded upon a contract between the State 
and offender which the criminal has entered into involuntarily when he 
impinged on society to too great an extent.  Justice is seen as the balance 
which ensues when everyone has neither too much nor too little of his due.  
Roman philosophers moved the debate further by adopting the essential 
tenets of Stoicism, that the wicked were irredeemably so and should thus be 
left to be dealt with by the world in whatever way was seen fit14.  Their 
overall concern was for deterrence, security, and to some extent, especially in 
early formulations such as the Twelve Tables, retaliation.  Si membrum rupsit, 
ni cum eo pacit, talio esto 15 endorsed the concept of the lex talionis whereby 
punishment was meted out limb for limb.  However, it is worth noting that 
even in this early formulation (and contrary to the popular belief in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 M. Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment. Berkeley. University of California Press. 1981. p183, 
discussing Gorgias,s36. 
10 ibid. 
11 K. Marx and F. Engels. “The German Ideology” in their Collected Works, vol. 5, 1845-7. 
London. Lawrence and Wishart. 1976. p59. 
12 M. Foucault. Discipline and Punish; the birth of the prison. trans. A. Sheridan. New York. 
Pantheon. 1977. 
13 von Bar, op. cit., pp386-7. 
14 ibid., p389. 
15 “If a person has maimed another’s limb, let there be retaliation in kind unless he makes 
agreement for composition with him.” XII Tables, viii, 2, quoting Festus, in Remains of Old 
Latin III. E. Warmington (ed.). London. Heinemann. 1938. 
savagery of ‘primitive law’), there is room for non-retaliatory, financial 
compensation in all but the most serious cases.  Likewise for Grotius, 
punishment is essentially bound to the notion of retribution, with the proviso 
that the criminal law must be exercised in the pursuit of a rational purpose16.  
Medieval philosophy is scarcely less diverse than that of the classical world, 
but most relevant here is the role of the divine order on the justification of 
punishment.  Punishment was, ultimately, justified in accordance with the 
law of nature, with God’s commands, and with the legitimate ordering of the 
world.  The need for natural law changes as a result of sin.  In a less than 
perfect world, legislation is but a pale shadow of the divine law to which it 
must struggle to conform.  Punishment may be an earthly activity but its 
ultimate justification rests with God17. 
 
 Hobbes follows in the long tradition of retributivism as his justification 
for punishment18.  He defines punishment as  
...an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, 
or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a 
Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may 
thereby the better be disposed to obedience.19  
 
 
For Hobbes, the essential feature of society is the existence of the social 
contract which transfers the innate right to punish to the sovereign.  “At the 
                                                          
16 von Bar, op. cit., p399. 
17 For this complex body of ideas, see E. Troeltsch. The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. 
trans. O. Wyon. New York. Harper Row. 1960, especially vol. 1. 
18 A. Norrie, Law, Ideology and Punishment. Kluwer. Dordrecht. 1991, p 31. 
root of the social contract lies the classical retributivist idea of the individual 
qualifying for punishment through his prior legislative act.”20.  This 
establishes Hobbes as the forerunner of modern retributivism, but however 
one interprets Hobbes in general, he seems to hold to the centrality of natural 
law21.  Similarly Locke places his emphasis on the necessity of upholding the 
law of nature.  For him, everyone has the right to punish criminals, but only to 
such a degree that it will prevent them from breaking the law which speaks of 
a deterrent outlook.  However, the right to punish is expressly limited22. 
 
 Significant in this area, and of particular importance for a Scottish 
perspective, is the work of  David Hume, for whom “all human laws are 
founded on rewards and punishments...”23.  Hume bases his acceptance of 
punishment on the view that justice is in everyone’s interests.  The human 
condition and common interest give rise to the need for society and therefore 
the requirement for a rule-governed structure without which society would 
not be possible.  Upon this he bases a need for justice which in turn provides a 
rationale for the use of punishment to maintain justice24.  Everyone benefits 
from the operation of justice, which is promoted by enlightened self-interest, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19 T. Hobbes, Leviathan. R. Tucker (ed.). Cambridge. Cambridge U.P. 1996, p214. 
20 Norrie, op. cit., p32. 
21 The natural law (or law of nature) is “immutable and external; what they forbid can never be 
lawful, what they command can never be unlawful.” Hobbes, de Cive, III, p29 quoted in 
Taylor, op. cit., p25. See also Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 14 and 15. 
22 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690. New York. Gryphon Editions. 1994, pp169-70. 
23 D. Hume. Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.). Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1888, 
p410. 
even though justice is required because humans are prone to ignore their best 
interests, preferring instead the wages of selfish motivation.  For Hume, 
government is there, among other things, to force the reluctant to consider 
their true interests, entrench equity and punish those who encroach upon 
justice, and thus punishment in general clearly has its place in society as a 
whole25. 
 
 For Kant, first awakened from his “dogmatic slumbers”26 by Hume, 
questions of morality were no less central than they were for Hume27.  The 
sole justification for punishment is that the individual has committed a crime 
for which, as a morally autonomous agent, the offender bears responsibility.  
Thus punishment may have utilitarian value, but the touchstone for the 
infliction of punishment must remain desert.  For Kant, equal distribution of 
punishment is already presupposed by the requirement of just deserts for the 
criminal.  If he is to receive the punishment he deserves, it follows he should 
also receive the just degree of punishment28, and this can only be achieved by 
use of the talio  principle.  Overall, Kant, like Hobbes, sees men as free and 
rational beings, and therefore creates a theory of punishment in accordance 
with this view of the human condition.  Both theories founder when applied 
                                                                                                                                                                      
24 “But tho’ it is possible for men to maintain a small uncultivated society without 
government, ‘tis impossible they shou’d maintain a society of any kind without justice.” ibid., 
p541. 
25 ibid., pp534-39. 
26 I. Kant. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to present itself As A Science. 
trans. P.G. Lucas. Manchester. Manchester U.P. 1953. p9. 
27 On the similarity between Hume and Kant see N. Kemp Smith. The Philosophy of David 
Hume. A Critical Study of its origins and central doctrines. London. Macmillan. 1949. p560, fn 1. 
to the stark realities of the real world where criminals are seldom rational and 
almost always ruled by their passions. 
 
 Jeremy Bentham stands as quite possibly the most renowned and 
influential legal philosopher.  He makes no attempt, as others before him had, 
to justify punishment as something willed or desired by the criminal, stating 
rather that it is imperative that crimes are prevented by punishments29.  In 
his theory, the prime foundation of the law is its social utility and thus the use 
of punishment to maintain the legal system is no longer (at least for Bentham) 
a point of controversy30.  The law is not permitted to impose punishments in 
cases where it serves no useful purpose, or indeed where it would be 
productive of harm31, in line with the utilitarian doctrine of the production of 
the greatest benefit or happiness for the greatest number32.  This however 
presupposes that the human mind is always rational and, further, that every 
prospective criminal will pause to undertake what would essentially be a 
cost-benefit analysis of the possible outcomes of his actions.  While the human 
capacity for logical reasoning is often outstanding, it would be overgenerous 
to impute to all an infallible capacity for rational action on every occasion.  
Moreover, many saw utilitarianism as a rather individualistic stance.  The 
interest may be that of the ‘greatest number’ but these remain a group of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 Norrie, op. cit., p41. 
29 von Bar, op. cit., p435. 
30 J. Bentham. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. J. Burns and H.L.A. 
Hart (eds.). London. Athlone Press. 1970. Ch. XIII.i.1 and 2. 
31 ibid., ch. XIII.i.3. 
individuals.  Chief amongst nineteenth century attacks upon individualism 
was that provided by Marxism. 
 
 The essential point about Marxism in relation to punishment is that it is 
placed in the context of the economic interpretation of society.  Punishment is 
inflicted by the State for infringements of its criminal legislation, and for 
Marx, both state and the legal system serve to further the interests of the 
ruling class rather than the ruled.  Thus one of the main functions of 
punishment is to reinforce privilege by maintaining the status quo33.  This 
seems to stress an economic basis for the social structures (law, politics etc.), 
but this would be to oversimplify his teaching.  Cavadino and Dignan not 
only show how later Marxist theories develop and modify economic 
determinism, but also doubt whether the man himself ever meant anything 
“so crude”34.   
 
 Of those who succeeded Marx, perhaps one of the more interesting to 
those concerned with the study of law is Foucault.  For him, the birth of the 
prison in the late eighteenth century represented the new industrial order’s 
need for a different way of exercising power and control over the inferior 
orders35.  Constant surveillance in prison allowed the authorities a new form 
of knowledge of the prisoner.  This ‘knowledge’ becomes, for Foucault, a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
32 ibid., ch. I.2. 
33 M. Cavadino and J. Dignan, The Penal System: An Introduction. London. Sage. 1992, p59. 
34 ibid., p60. 
‘discourse’, that is, a way of representing and conceptualising a topic which 
provided a channel through which power to discipline the prisoner (and in 
another much discussed example, the mental patient) could be exercised.   
 
 These functions of the criminal justice system have been discussed, 
albeit rather more conservatively than by Marx or Foucault, by Durkheim 
who saw punishment as having a particular role in maintaining such 
solidarity and thereby society as a whole36.  For the early Durkheim, 
primitive societies are held together by mechanical solidarity through the 
similarity of their tasks and social roles.  This gives rise to the “conscience 
collective”, being the sum of the common beliefs of the average members of a 
society37.  Durkheim saw crime as that which runs counter to tenets of the 
collective conscience, provoking a response in terms of repressive or 
retaliatory punishment serving to reinforce and restore that conscience38.  
Thus the purpose of punishment in primitive societies becomes retribution 
and denunciation aimed at the maintenance of social cohesion.  However the 
collective conscience has less of a role in maintaining more advanced 
societies.  This is because the population are engaged in differing tasks and so 
their consciences are likewise no longer  the same.  Social solidarity is now 
                                                                                                                                                                      
35 Cavadino and Dignan, op. cit., p66. 
36 E. Durkheim. Suicide. A Study in Sociology. trans. J. Spaulding and G. Simpson. London. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1952, p69. On this, see E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in 
Society. London. Macmillan. 1984, The Rules of Sociological Method. S. Lukes (ed.), W. Hall 
(trans.). London. Macmillan. 1982, and “Two Laws of Penal Evolution”. 2(1973). Economy and 
Society. 285-308. 
37 Durkheim, The Division of Labour, pp38-9. 
38 Ibid., p43 on crime and the collective conscience and pp44-64 on repressive law. 
organic rather than mechanical and the collective conscience is more vague 
and humanistic.  As a result, punishment becomes less important in the face 
of the rise of  restitutory rather than retributive punishments39.  Durkheim 
argues for two laws of penal evolution40, the first of which states that 
punishments are more severe in primitive societies where the central power is 
more absolute.  Much of this derives from the more religious character of less 
developed legal systems and the associated systems of shared beliefs which 
form the conscience collective of such societies.  As societies develop, a more 
humanistic attitude predominates and this serves to lessen both the scope and 
severity of punishments.  However the nature of punishment remains 
retaliation41.  The second law states that as a society develops, it comes to use 
incarceration more as its primary means of exacting punishment.  However 
much criticism has been levelled at Durkheim for this view based on an 
evolutionary approach which has subsequently been shown to be 
misconceived42. 
 
 Philosophical approaches to this question have, as shown, ranged far 
and wide, but most can be classified under one of two major schools of 
                                                          
39 Ibid., p68 et seq. 
40 “Two Laws of Penal Evolution”. 
41 D. Garland, “Durkheim’s Theory of Punishment: A Critique”, p44 in The Power to Punish. 
D. Garland and P. Young (eds.). London. Heinemann. 1983.  
42 D. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1990, p26. In fairness 
to Durkheim it should be said that his views on ‘primitive’ society and its ‘evolution’ become 
muted. By the time of his last published book, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life trans. 
J. Swain. 2nd edn. London. Allen and Unwin. 1976, Durkheim sees far greater complexity in 
the life of tribal societies. On this see S. Lukes. Emile Durkheim. His Life and Work. London. 
thought, either retributive or utilitarian theories as to the proper justification 
of punishment with or without reference to denunciation.  As to which 
school, if any, should predominate, the answer is unclear as each have both 
their strengths and weaknesses, but it may prove possible to find one which 
most suits the sphere of inchoate crime.  Hence the major schools will be 
discussed first, in order to establish the criteria they employ to justify 
punishment, before turning to the search for a theory which will suit the 
crimes under consideration. 
 
Main Theories of Punishment 
 
 These theories can be divided into a number of groups depending on 
how they are perceived.  They fall into one of either the forward-looking, 
backward-looking or mixed categories of justifications43.   
 
Retribution 
 
 Etymologically, retribution is in essence the repayment of a debt, but it 
is manifested in a number of guises.  The theory sees criminal justice as 
primarily concerned with the punishment of offenders.  At heart, though, the 
varying forms are all retrospective in nature.  The earliest form of justification 
uses the individual’s desert as its foundation, and is found in various 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Allen Lane. 1973. pp159, 167, and 450 et seq. However the evolutionary frame was not 
abandoned completely. 
manifestations of the lex talionis.  The paradigm here is the biblical provision 
allowing the avengers to take a life in recompense for the life lost.  Lacey, and 
most would agree with her, asserts that this is far from satisfactory in that, 
although it provides a system for determining the punishment inflicted on a 
murderer, there are cases which are not amenable to a mirror penalty44.  
However, it should be remembered that the lex talionis was not always 
applied strictly - for example the Twelve Tables allow for monetary 
compensation by agreement between the parties.  However, the talio principle 
also fails to take account of  a concept central to the use of punishment, that 
being the infliction of a penalty solely on those who can be held to be 
responsible agents.  There is no room for different degrees of punishment 
according to the level of wickedness displayed by the particular actor, which 
should be central to notions of justice, and the theory also fails to suggest why 
an individual should be punished.  As a result of this, Lacey concludes that 
the talio system is not sufficiently sure a foundation upon which to build a 
retributive theory of justification.   
 
 She then turns to examine the notion of culpability to see if it can 
provide a sound basis for the acceptance of retribution45.  It has the 
advantage of following our preconceptions about the institution of 
punishment in that it equates culpability to blame, and blame to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
43 N. Lacey, State Punishment. London. Routledge. 1988, p16. 
44 ibid., p17. 
45 ibid., p18. 
appropriate level of punishment.  However, as she indicates46, this principle 
is also fraught with difficulties in that established criminal offences exist 
wherein the conduct cannot be described as blameworthy, and yet it is still 
punished.  These include both regulatory and strict liability offences.  
Secondly, our current system of punishment leaves some aspects of human 
behaviour outwith the ambit of the criminal law insofar as they are kept 
within the private sphere even though they may properly be said to be 
morally blameworthy.  If the culpability principle were adopted, such ‘self-
regarding’ behaviour would become criminally liable47.  Both these criticisms 
arise from within the theory itself, but moreover it is unclear why the 
attribution of blame should lead to the principled infliction of punishment so 
unquestioningly.  The culpability principle does not explain why we should 
use previous blameworthy conduct as sufficient reason to punish48.  None of 
the desert-based explanations satisfy Lacey sufficiently for her to accept 
retributivism as a justification for punishment49.   
 
 However an approach based on guilt does figure strongly in the work 
of some retributivists.  Perhaps none more so, according to Bean, than F.H. 
Bradley50.   
 
                                                          
46 ibid., p19 
47 ibid., p20. 
48 ibid., p21. 
49 ibid., p26. 
50 Bean, op. cit., p13. 
Punishment is punishment only where it is deserved.  We pay 
the penalty because we owe it for no other reason; and if 
punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than 
because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying 
injustice, an abominable crime and not what it pretends to be51. 
 
Bradley clearly asserts the need for a connection between punishment and 
guilt, and thus only the guilty can justifiably be punished.  When stated this 
way, the contrast between retribution and utilitarianism is clear.  Whereas 
punishment can be a means to another end for a utilitarian, this can never be 
so for a retributivist.  “Punishment can never be administered merely as a 
means for promoting another good, either with regard to the criminal himself 
or to civil society...”52.  The link between punishment and guilt can be upheld 
on logical grounds, but also morally when punishment is interpreted as a 
facet of responsibility53.  This link is the most substantial stick with which 
retributivists can beat utilitarians, for, unlike retributivists, they will allegedly 
allow for the punishment of the innocent if it provides a means to a social 
end.  Clearly utilitarians would not justify this practice in general.  Bean, 
however, gives an example of the type of situation where utilitarians have 
justified such punishment; where a teacher punishes the whole class in order 
to maintain discipline where the true culprit cannot be identified.  
 
 These are not the only ways of assessing the retributivist position.  It is 
commonly perceived as the payment of debts owed to society.  This is 
                                                          
51 F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies quoted in ibid., pp26-7. 
52 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, in Bean, op. cit., p13. 
criticised by Walker54 in that, although some crimes will fit this analogy, for 
example where society feels a murderer repays the feelings of insecurity and 
fear he engendered by serving his prison term, others will not.  Most 
importantly for this discussion, inchoate crimes, especially failed attempts, do 
not fit this framework since there is no debt owed.  Yet since these crimes are 
commonly seen as deserving of punishment, a more comprehensive theory 
which takes account of such crimes must be sought.  Another theory often 
used within retributivism is that of annulment, whereby the punishment is 
seen as removing the crime.  Again, in practice, this argument is not 
defensible.  As Walker highlights, although the victim can be compensated 
they can never, for example, be ‘unmugged’55.   
 
 This view finds its source in Hegel but is criticised by Ten as being 
founded on the notion of compensation which, although sometimes valuable, 
does not have the same focus as punishment56.  These criticisms are based on 
an interpretation of Hegel in which punishment is claimed to wipe out the 
crime and restore the status quo ante.  However it is possible to give the theory 
a different interpretation.  Hegel’s argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
the victim has certain rights which the criminal implicitly denies by virtue of 
his conduct; failure to punish the criminal amounts to admitting that the 
denial of the victim’s rights was correct; punishment annuls the crime in that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
53 Bean, op. cit., p14. 
54 Nigel Walker, Why Punish?. Oxford. Oxford U.P. 1991, p73. 
55 ibid., p74. 
it establishes that the victim had those rights.  Thus punishment is a means of 
asserting the existence of those rights57.  A less extreme version of this 
appears in claims that punishment removes the unfair advantage taken by the 
criminal when he broke the law58.  However this presupposes that in each 
criminal act, the actor acts with the explicit intention of taking an advantage 
to which he is not entitled.  Much criminal behaviour is accepted as being too 
spontaneous, and too much driven by passion rather than reason, to uphold 
this supposition.  There are numerous arguments which can be used to 
explain retribution as a justifying principle, but it is not the only theory 
capable of making sense of punishment. 
 
Utilitarianism 
 
 This theory forms the basis of a number of forward-looking arguments 
used to justify punishment but is mainly concerned with the reduction of 
crime.  The classic Benthamite theory is one in which the pain and costs 
involved in punishing the offender are outweighed by the increase in 
‘happiness’ caused by a reduced crime rate and increased security.  Thus the 
threat and the infliction of punishment are justified59.  Deterrence is perhaps 
the most readily understood of the theories.  It is utilitarian in that it uses both 
                                                                                                                                                                      
56 C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt and Punishment, Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1987, pp38-9. 
57 D.E. Cooper, “Hegel’s Theory of Punishment” in Z.A. Pelcynski (ed.). Hegel’s Political 
Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives. Cambridge. Cambridge U.P. 1971 cited in Ten, op. cit., 
pp39-40. 
58 Walker, op. cit., pp75-6. 
59 Lacey, op. cit., p27. 
the threat of, and actual, punishment in order to reduce the incidence of crime 
and thereby promote the ‘happiness’ of the majority, albeit at the expense of 
the minority.  The aim is to control action by recognising harmful conduct, 
and responding with the lesser evil of punishment.   
 
 Deterrence may be subdivided into two further strands; individual and 
general deterrence.  Individual deterrence is the process by which the 
criminal is punished and finds the experience sufficiently unpleasant to deter 
him from repeating his crime.  In practice, it seems that, whilst there is some 
value in punishment as a deterrent, overall other factors militate against it.  
These are known as labelling effects.  Labelling theory holds that to punish 
criminals labels and stigmatises them, thereby making future adherence to the 
law more difficult for them.  As Becker says,  
“…deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but 
rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and 
sanctions to an “offender”.  The deviant is one to whom that 
label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior 
that people so label.”60  
 
There persists a view that prison gives the criminal the best possible schooling 
in crime61, and research supports the view that while lawful occupations and 
opportunities tend to be closed to them, criminal ventures based on 
acquaintances made inside remain ever open62.  General deterrence holds 
that the individual is punished not to deter him from committing crime in the 
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future, but as an example to others.  Both statistical evidence, common sense 
and personal experience are said to substantiate the deterrent effect of 
punishment63.  However, for the Kantian, this theory does commit the 
cardinal sin of treating the offender as a means to an indeterminate social end, 
rather than as an end in himself.  The same reservations apply to deterrence 
theory with reference to the specific individual.  However it can be argued 
from the utilitarian view that a strict approach should be taken whereby 
punishment is justified purely because of its good consequences64.  From 
this, it is a short step, admittedly not taken by all utilitarians, to recognising 
that punishment cannot therefore be confined to the guilty since situations 
may arise where punishment of the innocent would create sufficient good 
consequences to outweigh the clear demerits.  Thus, for Ten, utilitarianism “is 
therefore committed to punishing the innocent person”65.  This he sees as a 
major reason for its rejection as a theory justifying punishment. 
 
 Rehabilitation has, over the course of this century, been the subject of 
many studies in order to assess the validity of its claims.  Programmes aimed 
at the rehabilitation of the offender have covered many areas, from retraining 
to the more extreme measures of psychotherapy and even surgery66, all with 
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the aim of reducing recidivism.  However the data collected does not seem 
adequately to support the utilitarian argument.  Rehabilitation does appear to 
treat the individual offender as an end in himself and thus avoids some of the 
criticisms levelled at the general deterrence theory, but given the wide range 
of the practical manifestations of the desire to rehabilitate, it is potentially 
open to serious abuse if used as a repressive tool67.  The view of crime as a 
manifestation of non-willed action requiring treatment has made it less 
popular in modern times.  It begins to take on the appearance, if not the 
reality, of one social group playing God with the behavioural characteristics 
of another group for the former’s own, allegedly justified ends.  However, 
rehabilitationist ideas date back into antiquity.  For Plato, the law stood as 
physician to the morally sick offender68.  This is a more complex theory than 
retribution and deterrence, in that it involves considerations of the 
individual’s social and mental welfare, and the long term effects of 
incarceration.  The aim is, as ever it was, to cure offenders of their sickness.69 
 
 Ideas of social protection can only justify some forms of punishment, 
and likewise approaches based on reparation or restitution seem suited, 
ideally, only to areas such as theft.  Also it can be argued that compensation 
should truly function as an addition to punishment rather than a substitute 
but insofar as the punishment itself has a reparatory aspect, that can be 
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justified on utilitarian grounds70.  Overall, the main retributivist criticism of 
the utilitarian theory is that it treats the individual as the means rather than as 
the end.  This amounts to a claim that the individual has a right to be treated 
as an autonomous agent capable of making moral choices71.  Lacey questions 
whether this actually makes sense.  She concludes that the true position must 
lie somewhere between the two camps.  It is wrong to say that actions against 
individuals can never be justified on the basis of the good they will do others, 
and equally it is wrong to ignore the individual completely in the interests of 
the common good72.   However she does extract from this a central and true 
criticism of utilitarianism, namely that it ignores “the separateness of 
persons” in favour of focusing on the overall satisfaction produced73. 
 
 Lacey feels the existence of mixed theories has arisen from the context 
of the difficulties faced regarding both prospective and retrospective theories.  
Perhaps the most famous proponent of a compromise theory is H.L.A. Hart.  
For him the general justifying aim of punishment is general deterrence, 
thereby placing him within the utilitarian school of thought.  Institutions 
aimed at inflicting punishment are set up with deterrence and social 
protection in mind - aims which justify the institution’s existence.  However 
when he comes to discuss whom we are justified in punishing, the principle 
of retribution applies as a limitation on his utilitarianism.  It is only justifiable 
                                                          
70 Lacey, op. cit., p35. 
71 ibid., p36. 
72 ibid., pp36-7. 
to punish offenders for actions they have undertaken responsibly, for which 
they deserve punishment. 
 
Denunciation 
 
 For von Bar, the true purpose of punishment is “active disapproval” of 
the criminal’s acts74.  Thus it matters not whether the criminal finds his 
punishment to be an evil, and if he rather treats it as a correctional benefit, 
this should not constitute grounds for changing the punishment in order to 
cause him actual suffering.  In order to express disapproval, there must be an 
element of disadvantage to the criminal, otherwise there is no incentive to 
obey the law, but disadvantage and physical suffering are not synonymous. 
  
 This approach to the justification of punishment holds that penalties 
are justified because they express disapproval of the criminal’s actions.  This 
approach can be held alongside one or other of the main theories, but some 
have asserted its role as the main justification for punishment75.  Walker cites 
both Durkheim76 and Stephen77 as proponents of this view, although, until 
recently, felt it had not been taken up by philosophers.  The first to take up 
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the challenge, according to Walker, was Feinberg78, who argues that 
punishments stand in a class of their own on account of their symbolic 
significance79.  The expressive function of punishment is shown in four ways; 
(1) authoritative disavowal (whereby a nation can disassociate itself from the 
wrongful acts of a citizen by punishing them)80;  
(2) symbolic non-acquiescence (whereby  society ensures that it does not 
condone criminal behaviour by allowing some conduct to go unpunished)81; 
(3) vindication of the law (where punishment is used to reinforce the law’s 
bite, for there is little point forbidding acts while simultaneously failing to 
punish the offender)82; 
(4) absolution of others (by punishing one of a group of suspects, the guilt is 
concentrated on him and the others absolved)83.   
 
Walker criticises Feinberg’s approach in that his choice of obscure examples 
illustrates the fact that punishments only sometimes function expressively, 
and indeed he accepts that Feinberg himself does not see sentences as 
uniformly expressive84. 
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 Feinberg does not appear to see denunciation as the overall 
justification for punishment, but rather as an adjunct to the other central 
purposes of punishment85.  However, Walker pinpoints Gross as a 
proponent of the validity of the expressive theory of punishment86.  Gross 
sees the criminal sanction not as a deterrent, but rather as a means of 
maintaining standards in the face of violations although in practice it is 
unlikely that the public are greatly influenced by any claimed denunciatory 
effect of punishment87.  However it is perhaps worthwhile considering 
whether such an expressive function can be used to justify the punishment of 
inchoate crime.  The argument in favour of punishment as denunciation relies 
on the need to restate, as firmly as possible, the authority of the legal system 
and its power to restrain the individual where appropriate.  Here the 
individual has acted in some way which the law deems inappropriate and 
there is felt a strong need to express institutional disapproval of those acts.  
This disapproval can go beyond that which, on an ex facie examination of the 
conduct, is truly merited by the seriousness of the crime.  Such a response is 
felt to be justified because the need to uphold the law is paramount, and if 
individuals are permitted to act in certain ways without fear of sanction, the 
law is thereby weakened.  A law more honoured in the breach than the 
observance is, in effect, no law at all.  From this argument it can be seen that a 
denunciatory justification does fit those crimes described as inchoate, 
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although perhaps alone it is insufficient to justify the level to which such 
crimes are punished. 
 
The Harm Principle 
 
 This principle is often discussed in relation to the punishment of 
complete crimes.  It is defined by Gross as “...an untoward occurrence 
consisting in a violation of some interest of a person”88.  The essence of the 
concept is that the intentional creation of harm or risk is the trigger for 
criminal liability.  As a whole, inchoate crime can be viewed as a continuum 
within which attempts clearly cause the most harm.  There can be no doubt 
that in many cases of attempt, there will have been the intentional  creation of 
some harm, although clearly less than would be caused by the complete 
version of the crime.  In incitement too it can be argued that encouraging 
someone to commit a crime causes a level of moral harm which society would 
find unacceptable, although this argument is much weaker than that raised 
for attempted crimes.  It can be said to be both morally wrong and harmful to 
the incitee to put temptation in their way.  Whether the inciter is a causal 
agent and therefore morally responsible for the harm he has in mind is an 
initially plausible argument, but it must be remembered that for the inciter to 
function as the causal link which brought about the harm, there must be 
actual harm.  In incitement, the real harm is only potential, except in the weak 
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sense in which incitement can be said to cause harm.  However in relation to 
conspiracy, it is harder to say that any harm has been caused.  Is it inherently 
harmful to society for a number of individuals to meet and privately agree to 
commit a crime at a later date? It seems clear that there is little, if anything, 
which can properly be called harmful conduct.  In the light of this, the harm 
principle is perhaps not the best guide in seeking a justification for the 
punishment of inchoate crime as a whole. 
 
 With these philosophical stances in mind, we can now turn to the more 
practical aspects of how the punishment of the inchoate crimes is, or should 
be, justified. 
 
Justification for the Punishment of Inchoate Crimes 
 
Incitement 
 
 All three inchoate offences can be justified along the lines that 
prevention is better than cure.  It has been noted that 
 
Without regard to whether it is correct to say that solicitations are 
more dangerous than attempts, it is fair to conclude that the 
purposes of the criminal law are well served by the inclusion of 
the crime of solicitation within the substantive criminal law.89 
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If conduct which as yet does not amount to a full offence can be caught while 
still at the inchoate stage, this will further the common good.  This applies in 
varying degrees to all three offences, although conspiracy also has a more 
political aspect to the justification used for its existence.  The argument in 
relation to incitement is that the criminal has shown himself to be dangerous 
to some extent.  However, arguments based on social protection can also be 
used here to justify punishment to a degree in the name of protecting those 
who are the targets of incitement from being turned into criminals.  It is clear, 
though, that the type on conduct involved (persuasion, encouragement, 
advice) is all at a very early stage in relation to the commission of any crime, 
and therefore it is harder to justify the imposition of punishment.  It can also 
be argued that the degree of harm caused by such acts is minimal, if present 
at all since it is not necessary for the incitee to act upon the encouragement.   
 
 It is, however, possible to formulate a more political argument for the 
criminalisation of incitement, in that such persuasion towards crime can be 
aimed at an individual or a group, and can also be disseminated through the 
press.  Thus it could be seen as a useful weapon against both propaganda and 
malicious conduct designed to arouse unrest among larger groups.  Both of 
these arguments, if used, would lead to justification of incitement under the 
guise of social protection. 
 
Conspiracy 
  In order to safeguard its legitimacy, the law must provide an adequate 
justification for its actions.  Thus each sanction must be supported by a 
convincing rationale for its existence.  The offence of conspiracy has proved 
complex, not least because of the ambiguous nature of the crime itself - 
indeed Sayre describes it as “a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-
considered thought”90. 
 
The heart of this rationale lies in the fact - or at least the 
assumption - that collective action toward an antisocial end 
involves a greater risk to society than individual action toward 
the same end.91 
 
 
Conspiracy is thus structured so as to allow for the easier prosecution of 
groups which have plotted to effect proscribed activities and indeed this has 
often been used as a significant government weapon against the proliferation 
of controversial political associations.  This means that it is more likely that 
members of the group will be penalised for what they have said or the 
identity of their associates than for their actions and is a cause for concern 
among civil libertarians, especially in the United States where it is seen as a 
breach of first amendment freedoms92.   
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 As with all inchoate offences, the rationale for punishment only exists 
within preventive and reformative theories of punishment.  It cannot function 
within retributive systems since they rely on inflicting punishment in relation 
to harm caused.  Here there is no harm against which to measure the 
punishment and Snyman feels this is why inchoate offences do not figure in 
early systems where the talio  principle is strong93.  However, this is not the 
only theory advanced to support the existence of conspiracy as a crime.  
Explanation is also sought within the general concept of inchoate crime as 
preventive action without reference to the features unique to this particular 
offence and also as a supplement to liability for attempts in catching 
behaviour at a yet earlier stage.  Thus there is some controversy as to whether 
punishment of conspiracy can be justified, and if so which theory should 
triumph. 
 
Inchoate crime theory 
 
 This approach takes as its starting point the nature of conspiracy as an 
inchoate offence together with incitement and attempt.  All three aim to 
prevent crime by penalising conduct while the prospective offence remains 
unconsummated.  Thus the criminal law takes a long term view of the effect 
their actions will have should the parties be allowed to continue, and on the 
basis of preventing further harm, founds its rationale for early intervention.  
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This approach, where the ultimate objective has yet to be effected, could 
conceivably be borne out by the facts of a case, for example where thieves are 
apprehended outside a building with tools clearly intended for the 
implementation of their criminal purpose.  However the majority of cases do 
not fit into this theory since most conspiracies are brought to light only after 
the crimes involved have been partially or fully completed.  In these cases, the 
only preventive effect of prosecution for conspiracy would be the deterrent 
effect associated with any legal sanction. 
 
Collective action theory 
 
 This theory assumes that some actions, although harmless and 
insignificant when contemplated by an individual, become dangerous and 
worthy of punishment when a group is involved94.  The illogicality of this 
rationale is highlighted by Gillies who feels that the real crux of the argument 
should be the character and consequences of the act, not the number of 
participators95.  By imposing liability for conspiracy, the courts have 
attached great significance to the fact of agreement96.  This is the element 
which distinguishes individual from collective action as it is seen as the step 
towards completion of the crime which removes the need for the proximity  
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required for an individual’s non-consummate actions to amount to the 
inchoate offence of attempt. 
 
 A number of arguments are used to justify the supposition that an act 
contemplated by a group is intrinsically more dangerous than the same act 
contemplated by an individual.  Often these arguments can be reduced to the 
claim that it is less likely that every member of the group will hear the voice 
of his conscience and withdraw before the conspiracy is put into effect.  It is 
supposed that the existence of a group in these situations provides mutual 
support and encouragement97, and that the increase in numbers allows for a 
more efficient division of labour and therefore a greater prospect of success 
and the infliction of greater harm.  However, cases can be constructed where 
one resolute individual will be seen as substantially more socially dangerous 
than two vacillating conspirators.  Arguments can be advanced on each side. 
 
Attempts 
 
 The question of justifying the punishment of attempts, and of the 
appropriate level of punishment in relation to the completed crime are both 
somewhat vexed topics.   
 
The purpose of punishing attempts 
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 The clearest argument used to justify the sanctions imposed on 
attempters emphasises its preventive and deterrent role in the criminal law.  
Whether the aim is rehabilitation, incapacitation, or deterrence, there is good 
reason for punishing attempts in furtherance of crime prevention.  There is 
precious little point in allowing the criminal to attempt his contemplated 
crime without fear of reprisal.  If there is a sanction for both successfully and 
unsuccessfully carrying out his intentions, the potential criminal is given 
greater pause for thought and a more forceful reason to desist at an earlier 
stage.  Few criminals can conceivably proceed to effect their intended course 
of action with failure in mind as the end result.  However, many must be 
aware that failure is a possibility, and thus as the threat of punishment hangs 
over an attempt as well as a completed crime, this can only add to the overall 
deterrent effect of the criminal law98.    
 
The appropriate level of punishment 
 
 The question often asked is whether or not attempts deserve as severe 
punishment as is meted out for the full offence.  The answer most commonly 
given in legal practice is that attempts merit only a lesser degree of 
punishment99, whereas a great many theorists hold to the view that both 
should be punished to the same extent.  Rehabilitation theory favours equal 
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punishment because here the aim is to prevent dangerous acts by correcting 
the offender’s dangerous behaviour100.  Unless the failure stems from a 
change of heart, it is unlikely that the attempter is any less of a social danger 
than the successful criminal and therefore the aim, and so the level, of 
punishment should be the same regardless of success or failure. 
 
 Duff highlights the subjective argument that attempts should be 
punished as severely as completed crimes because there is no moral 
difference between the two. 
 
Justice requires that criminal liability should depend on choice, 
not chance; on what an agent freely and responsibly does, not 
on what happens as a matter of chance; on what is within her 
control, not on factors lying beyond her control.101 
 
This, he feels, requires us to look at the subjective aspects of the attempter’s 
behaviour because it is that which he has chosen to do which truly describes 
the character of his actions.  Factors outside his control, which determine the 
objective quality of his acts, should have no bearing on liability.  He uses that 
example of two actors - one fires and kills his victim, the other fires and 
misses because his victim moves.  Subjectively both acts have the same 
murderous quality102.  However the law clearly does distinguish between 
the two because it imposes different levels of punishment and to justify this, 
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Duff feels it is necessary to show that the different objective aspects of each 
act make a difference in terms of the actors’ culpability.  As he has shown, the 
subjective stance highlights how an attempt does not differ from a complete 
crime, and argues that is the limit of its relevance to guilt. 
 
 He feels however that our reaction to the objective aspects of the act 
provide the reason for the lesser punishment of attempts..  The natural and 
proper reaction to an attempt, for example to murder, is relief that the final 
evil of an intentional death has not been realised.  The fact of failure matters, 
at a moral level, to both the actor, and to society at large103.  It is this reaction 
which the law reflects in its gradation of punishments.  To punish attempts 
and complete crimes equally would be to deny the validity of this moral 
response.  This, he feels, is not to reject the subjective argument that liability 
cannot be allowed to depend on chance, but instead to acknowledge that the 
subjective and objective aspects of actions cannot be separated wholly one 
from the other.  This argument has two central attractions.  It both explains 
current practice and accords with the instinctive approach to this issue.  That 
is that, in order to attach due opprobrium to the full offence, an attempt must 
be seen to be punished more lightly.  This does not remove the deterrent 
effect of punishing attempts, but introduces a welcome sense of proportion 
into the law and seeks to hold to an important philosophical insight, namely 
the autonomy and responsibility of the human agent. 
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  For a deterrence theorist the purpose of punishment is to make the 
prospect of committing an antisocial act as unappealing as possible.  If 
attempts were to be punished less severely, these would become less 
unattractive, thus defeating some of the purpose of the law.  Traditional 
retributivist have tied punishment to the gravity of wrongdoing, the 
paradigm being the talio system.  Wrongdoing was seen as the evil intention 
and therefore primarily as a moral wrong.  The intention was paramount 
rather than the particular outcome and thus the actor was just as 
blameworthy morally for intending to rob a bank and succeeding, as for 
intending and failing.  Punishment was tied to moral blameworthiness and 
thus attempts and completed crimes held punishable to the same degree.  
However Davis feels that this represents an older view of retributivism and 
that modern proponents take a different approach104.  This approach focuses 
on the loss involved, either to the victim or to society in terms of the loss of 
security and, although he feels it would allow some attempts to be punished 
to a lesser degree, he feels it is unsatisfactory in that it does not explain why 
an attempt creates less individual or social harm than a complete crime. 
 
 Davis does seem more interested in what he sees as a third form of 
retributivism which measures the degree of wrongdoing by reference to the 
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unfair advantage the criminal has seized in breaking the law105.  He proceeds 
to apply it to the law of attempts by asserting that retributivism presupposes 
a reasonably just legal system.  He does so because he sees retribution as 
setting out a system of just punishment, which would require to be grounded 
in a just legal system.  The important point here is that a just legal system 
protects each of its subjects from  the somewhat Hobbesian fear of what 
others may do if unchecked.  This can only function within a reciprocal 
system where everyone does or refrains from doing that which the law 
requires, and this reciprocity can be assured in a number of ways.  Davis feels 
that a truly ‘good’ person will conform to these requirements because “doing 
otherwise is unthinkable”106 and a morally self-conscious agent will conform 
because to behave otherwise would be to unfairly prejudice those who 
behaved properly.  The third reason for conforming to the law is the fear of 
punishment, but this is only motivation for a select group of potential 
criminals.  The unfair advantage gained by breaking the law only arises 
because the law itself creates this reciprocal arrangement which then allows 
room for a form of cheating whereby the criminal exploits the advantage 
while relying on others to conform.   
 
 Davis sees taking this advantage as comparable to buying a licence to 
do the act in question107.  Imagine, he suggests, a society in which the 
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authorities use an auction to sell a specified number of licences or advance 
pardons.  The price of these licences would equate to both the degree of unfair 
advantage taken by the criminal and the appropriate level of punishment, and 
thus crimes could be ranked.  The number distributed would reflect the level 
of incidents of that particular crime which the society was prepared to 
tolerate, and licences for the more serious crimes would be more limited.  He 
also conjectures the emergence of what he calls “protective associations”108 
which would aim to buy up and not use as many licences as possible in order 
to restrict the number available for true criminals.  He then moves to consider 
the position of attempted crimes within this framework. 
 
 He feels  that if an attempt deserves less punishment than a complete 
crime, the licence to commit an attempt should likewise be worth less, but the 
question remains as to the content of a licence to attempt109.  He maintains 
that the crucial point about an attempt is that for some reason the harm which 
characterises the complete crime fails to arise.  This leads him to the 
conclusion that attempt is primarily a crime of mens rea 110 and, within that, 
requiring an intent to bring about the actus reus of the complete crime.  Thus 
he feels that a licence to attempt must identify the actus reus of the complete 
crime and then excuse the holder from intending and beginning to do the act, 
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but not excuse him for bringing about the characteristic harm of the complete 
crime. 
 
 He recognises that several objections have been raised against this 
theory, one of which is that licences for attempts would in reality be worth 
nothing.  Primarily because it would constitute no more than a licence to fail, 
and since no self-respecting criminal intends to fail to bring about the crime in 
question, no-one would want one or bid for one, and therefore it would be 
worth nothing in an auction111.  Davis counters this by raising the issue of 
supply and demand.  The criticism relies on the idea that there are sufficient 
licences to commit the complete crime for all those who want one, and that 
the licences are circulating at a price the potential criminal can afford.  This 
would clearly not be the case since society could neither afford nor tolerate an 
indeterminate number of instances of every crime equal to the number of so 
disposed criminals.  Thus, he argues, there will always be fewer licences to 
commit the complete crime than there are criminal desirous of one and hence 
many would feel that it would be better to have a licence to attempt than none 
at all.  If they do fail, and assuming they have thought rationally about their 
intended actions they must recognise this as a possibility, they will be covered 
by the licence to attempt.  He also goes on to postulate a further reason why a 
criminal may wish to buy a licence to attempt112.  If such a licence is to be 
cheaper than a full licence, it may appear desirable to the potential criminal to 
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buy the appropriate one even though he already has the full licence.  If caught 
at the attempt stage, he can then trade in his cheaper licence to attempt in 
order to escape, rather than wasting a valuable full licence which would be 
better used at a later date to excuse his success rather than a failed attempt.  
This leads him to feel that there should be a market for licences to attempt, 
especially if they are cheaper than full licences113, which then opens the 
debate as to whether they would necessarily be cheaper. 
 
 This brings him to the second objection raised to his theory, that being 
that a licence to attempt would be worth precisely the same as a full licence.  
If this objection is valid it would mean that attempts should be punished hand 
in hand with the complete crimes.  The objection gives an important role to 
the protective associations.  They are seen to be as concerned to buy up (and 
so take out of circulation) licences to attempt in much the same way as 
licences for the complete crimes.  They do not want potential criminals to try 
their hand at a range of crimes because they fear attempts as much as they do 
successes.  Thus they would raise the price of attempt licences at auction to be 
roughly equal to that of full licences.  However, Davis argues that there will 
always be more licences on the market than the protective associations can 
buy.  This is because the auctioneers will look at the level of crime produced 
by the last issue of licences in order to determine the number of new licences 
to issue.  The number bought up by the associations will not have resulted in 
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criminal activity and thus the auctioneers will be happy to issue that amount 
again, before they consider how many more they should issue in relation to 
the acceptable level of crime thereby tolerated114.  It should be noted that this 
argument seems to defeat its own purpose - if this is so, surely it removes the 
reason for the existence of the associations.  This would mean that irrespective 
of the number they buy up, the auctioneers will always issue as many extra as 
they feel society will tolerate.  What then is the point of buying them up in the 
first place? Thus Davis concludes that attempt licences will always be useful 
as an alternative, although clearly not as useful as a full licence, and thus the 
price of the former should normally be less than that of the latter.   
 
 He then turns the application of this theory to our own society115.  He 
sees the attempter as having risked committing the harm envisaged  by the 
full offence even though he did not actually commit it, and therefore he is 
deserving of an punishment.  This is because risking the harm is a means of 
taking an unfair advantage over law abiding citizens, but deserves less 
punishment because he has not taken such an advantage as the successful 
criminal. 
 
 Duff raises a number of objections to Davis’ theory116 as to whether it 
will lead to a complete ranking of crimes in relation to their seriousness.  One 
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problem he foresees is that there are two classes of bidder at the proposed 
auction - the potential criminal and the protective association117.  Each of 
these bring their own particular ranking of crimes with them; the potential 
criminal will rank crimes in terms of the potential for satisfaction or gain, 
whereas the association will use the degree of threat posed to an interest as its 
criterion.  On this basis, it is clear that the association will view attempted 
murder as a higher ranking crime than attempted theft since preservation of 
life ranks above that of property.  However, it seems to me likely that many 
criminals would view attempted theft as a more desirable crime to commit 
since they would be less likely to be apprehended and even if they were, the 
penalties would be less severe.  Thus the associations might bid more for a 
licence covering attempted murder, while the more realistic criminal might 
see a licence for attempted theft as more inviting.  Since the two groups use 
differing criteria, it is difficult to see how this can produce an overall ranking 
of all crimes.  It may produce a ranking of the different crimes within any one 
type of criminal activity, but a further theory would, according to Duff, be 
required to establish how different types of crimes ranked as against each 
other, and therefore how they should be punished proportionately. 
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 Davis’ theory has also been subjected to attack by Andrew von 
Hirsch118.  He sees the approach discussed by Davis as emanating from a 
theory of desert which balances benefits and burdens by imposing 
punishment in order to restore the imbalance created by the unfair advantage 
taken by the criminal.  He questions how much guidance the benefits-burdens 
theory gives when deciding the quantum of punishment in a given case.  
Davis’ argument focuses on the unfair advantage taken by the criminal when 
he fails to restrain his own conduct while benefiting from the restraint 
exercised by the rest of society.  The quantum of punishment should reflect the 
extent of the advantage thus taken, but since this cannot be measured directly, 
guidance should be sought indirectly from the price of a licence to commit the 
crime in question in the hypothetical auction.  However the licence analogy is 
something of a puzzle to von Hirsch; licences, in his eyes, are permissive (in 
return for the payment of a fee, the licensee may legitimately engage in the 
conduct in question), whereas the criminal law is both prohibitive and 
condemnatory (conduct is made subject to a sanction as an indication of the 
inappropriateness of such behaviour, and so the actor ought not to engage in 
the conduct even if his would be willing to pay the price for so doing).  In the 
light of this, von Hirsch feels it would be very strange if the analogy of a 
licence were to help clarify the question of the distribution of 
punishments119.  When inspected closely, he feels that the model Davis 
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advocates is unsatisfactory in a number of respects, one of these being the 
shift in the meaning attached to ‘advantage’ in later versions of this theory.  
He maintains that earlier proponents of this view were keen to point out that 
the benefits accruing to the offender and the burdens imposed on the lawful 
were not to be taken in a literal sense120.  The advantage lies rather in the 
freedom of action which the criminal gains.  Von Hirsch’s criticism of Davis’ 
version of the unfair advantage theory is that the auction model presupposes 
exactly that literal advantage which earlier advocates tried to exclude121.  He 
also queries the ranking of crimes that would result from an auction 
model122.  The seriousness of a crime is often related to its harmfulness and 
the degree of culpability involved in its commission but Davis prefers the 
auction model as a simpler means of ranking crimes.  However, for von 
Hirsch, the auction model provides a different standard for evaluating the 
seriousness of a crime, which in turn stresses what he feels to be an alien 
feature of criminal conduct.  The ranking of the crime will depend on the 
offenders’ bids for licences, and these will reflect their assessment of how 
profitable they expect the conduct to be, rather than any measure of the harm 
likely to be caused.  Thus a licence to steal a substantial sum of money would 
be more attractive, more expensive and therefore the crime would be of a 
higher ranking than, say, aggravated assault which would seem less 
appealing.  This does not reflect the way most people would view the two 
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crimes.  The interest violated by aggravated assault (the victim’s physical 
safety) would be deemed more important than the financial interest violated 
by the theft, and so most commentators would view the assault as the more 
serious crime.   
 
 Thus von Hirsch disagrees with the auction model in relation to the 
provision of a grading of offences since it leaves the seriousness of the crime 
dependent on the size of bid the offender is prepared to make, which in turn 
depends on his view of the profitability of the conduct involved.  He 
concludes that some crimes can indeed be conceived of as taking an unfair 
advantage over others.  In this category he would place such crimes as tax 
evasion which do not directly injure anyone else but can be seen as taking a 
benefit to which the offender is not entitled.  He has refused to pay his own 
tax but continues to reap the benefits of others’ compliance by way of the 
services he receives.  However, tax evasion is hardly the archetypal criminal 
offence and to explain more straightforward offences this way involves 
placing considerable strain on popular conceptions of their relative 
seriousness123.   
 
 Questions relating to the appropriate level of punishment for 
attempted crimes inevitably raise issues covered in discussions of the proper 
role for the result of a crime in its punishment.  This area focuses on whether 
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the element of luck (often termed ‘moral luck’) involved in whether the 
outcome is criminal or not should have any bearing on the degree of 
culpability imputed to the actor.  The area is of general application and will be 
considered as such before reference is made to attempted crimes in particular.  
Richard Parker takes up  discussion of this area in an often cited article124.  
He illustrates the effect that chance occurrences can have on the final outcome 
of an act with a memorably ‘exotic’ (to borrow his phrase) example.  He 
chooses the fate of Rasputin.  We are told that his captors poisoned, shot, 
bludgeoned, stabbed and castrated their victim, bound his body, wrapped it 
in cloth and dumped it into a frozen river.  The result of this was the death of 
Rasputin, but not, as one might suppose, as a result of his injuries, for when 
the body was found, it was clear he had partly freed himself, and had died of 
drowning.  In Parker’s example we are asked to imagine a further twist to the 
tale; that the victim actually proved sufficiently hardy to survive the 
ordeal125.  Parker feels this chance occurrence would obviously have no 
effect on the intentions of his captors, nor would it effect their conduct since 
they had done all they felt necessary (and, arguably, more) to be sure of his 
death.  Thus, with no alteration to the intentional or conduct-orientated 
aspects of the offence, how could it be said that the victim’s survival, due 
solely to his own strength and against all the odds, should diminish the 
seriousness of the offence charged against his captors? Yet, as Parker notes, 
                                                          
124 R. Parker, “Blame, Punishment and the Role of Result”. 21(1984). American Philosophical 
Quarterly. 269-76. 
125 ibid., p269. 
this is exactly what would happen in virtually every Anglo-American 
jurisdiction126.  Penalties for aggravated assault or attempted murder can be 
extremely punitive, but these options available to the court in the imagined 
example are as nothing compared to the possible penalties for murder, 
especially in the United States. 
 
 Parker formulates this problem in general terms;  
 
On what rational grounds can we proportion punishment to the 
results of an actor’s conduct when those results are largely or 
entirely beyond the actor’s control?127.   
 
However, in practice, those results - the harm caused - form a major part of 
the method used to assess the seriousness of the crime and therefore the 
severity of the punishment128.  He feels there is a connection between this 
concern with ‘harm’ and some of our shared moral intuitions.  Many would 
think it pointless to punish someone who has caused no harm, since there is 
nothing for which to punish him.  Vice versa it is clear that if the actor has 
caused some harm, there is a reason for his punishment - the causation of the 
harmful result.  He also maintains the existence of a link between criminal law 
and blameworthiness and finds it less than surprising that most of us would 
be content to blame an actor who causes harm more than one who does not.  
He feels that an actor’s blameworthiness and his chances of being punished 
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should if possible go hand in hand but thinks “...it is false that results are 
generally relevant to either one’s blameworthiness or his punishability.”129.   
 
 Again illustration is provided in an imagined situation130.  He 
envisages a situation where two friends (I shall call them F1 and F2) go to a 
party and become very drunk.  They discover two loaded rifles belonging to 
their host and decide to see who has the best aim using the street lamp 
outside the window as a target.  Each try several times without hitting the 
lamp, but one of F1’s shots ricochets and unfortunately fatally strikes a passer-
by whose presence was unforeseen by either actor.  Parker examines the 
conduct of both F1 and F2 and feels that “given the similarity of (their) 
conduct, it seems perfectly appropriate to claim equal blameworthiness on 
each of (their) parts”131.  For him this argument is proved by the fact that, 
had it been unclear at first whose bullet had done the deed, most 
commentators would still have been content to apportion blame equally 
between them.  This is so because there is no morally relevant difference 
between the two - the fact that one actor killed the passer-by and the other did 
not is purely a matter of chance, since both were involved in conduct which 
could easily have led to that outcome.  “Hence (they) are equally 
blameworthy despite the unequal results of (their) conduct”132.  Opponents 
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of his view would treat these two actors rather differently.  He paraphrases 
their argument in saying that here, F1 is to be blamed more because he is to 
blame for more.  However, Parker feels this argument is flawed; to say that F1 
is blameable for more because he has caused more in the way of a result is 
merely misleading, whereas to say that someone who is caused more of a 
result is more morally blameworthy is simply not true133.  A second 
interpretation of the opposition’s argument involves separating the actor’s 
conduct from the results and holding him blameworthy for both, thus adding 
up to a greater level of blameworthiness than the actor who did not cause the 
results.  Again, Parker rejects this because he feels an actor can only be 
punishable within the criminal law, and held to be blameworthy, for his 
conduct (encompassing acts and circumstances), not for the consequences that 
flow from it.  Even though he knows an event is underway, A recklessly fires 
towards the grandstand of a stadium narrowly missing the crowd, but 
fortunately his shot harmlessly finds an inanimate target.  B does much the 
same, but on a day when he knows the ground will be empty.  However a 
custodian is patrolling the area and is shot and killed.  Thus B has caused the 
greater degree of ‘result’ but it requires an elastic imagination to declare B 
more blameworthy than A.  This highlights the criterion Parker would rather 
use to assess the existence and degree of blameworthiness and hence 
punishment, that being the risk of harm created by the actor’s conduct. 
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 In the examples he uses, Parker feels that each actor could be said to 
have caused the harm and so be guilty by misfortune; likewise it is possible to 
be innocent of the complete crime by good fortune134.  It is into this latter 
category that Parker puts those attempts where the actor has done all  he can 
to achieve his result.  If the failure of the attempt is purely a matter of chance 
and does not depend on any factor which could be said to be in the actor’s 
control, then he is as blameworthy and should be as punishable as the 
successful criminal135.  The only possible reason for punishing them 
differently requires that the element of luck which determines exactly what 
result is achieved be morally relevant, and Parker has already dismissed this 
argument.  He feels that  
 
...if a given punishment is the just dessert for a completed crime, 
then no less a punishment is the just dessert of at least some 
attempts to commit that crime136.   
 
Equally, were there to be a difference between the punishment of each (in 
other words, were the attempter to be punished less) the successful criminal 
would in effect be punished beyond that which he deserved since they are 
equally blameworthy.   
 
 Parker anticipates that some readers may find the argument strange 
and seeks to avoid this conclusion137.  Any perceived strangeness in his 
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conclusion as to punishability and moral luck is, he feels, due to difference in 
the underlying concept which his theory employs.  He explains it as follows; 
it is the creation of risk rather than the results of conduct that make it a fit 
subject for punishment.  This entails a change in the perception of what it is 
that makes a crime, since it removes from the ambit of ‘crime’ anything which 
is a result of the conduct rather than a part of it.  Whatever the merits, or need 
for this conceptual change of heart, there is a clear appeal in the view that 
luck should have no place in the criminal law.  However Parker is not alone in 
discussing moral luck or the relevance of factors outwith the actor’s control 
on his responsibility for them. 
 
 Thomas Nagel has also considered the question.  According to him,  
 
(p)rior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot 
be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due 
to factors beyond their control.138.   
 
He feels that when someone is blamed for their actions, it says not only that 
the actions themselves are bad things, but that he too is ‘bad’.  Further, 
without really knowing why, it is commonly felt that we should not assess 
someone at a moral level for acts (good or bad) which are not under the 
actor’s control.  Thus an involuntary movement, physical force or ignorance 
of the attendant circumstances will all excuse the actor from becoming the 
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subject of moral assessment.  But, as Nagel remarks, there are many other 
external influences over which we have no control which affect the outcome 
of our actions, and these broader influences are generally not thought to 
excuse liability139.  Our actions, and so that which is also the subject of any 
moral assessment, is always to some extent determined by external factors.  
There is a moral distinction between the crimes of reckless driving and 
manslaughter, but Nagel points out that the actor will only be guilty of, and 
morally judged for manslaughter if by chance a pedestrian happens to be in 
the road when he runs the red light140.  He then formulates this into a 
general statement; where a significant part of the conduct in question 
depends on factors outside the actor’s control and yet he is still morally 
judged, the situation can be classed as one of moral luck141.  However, this 
suffers from the possibility of infinite application.  If control over all 
significant factors is applied uniformly, then most natural moral assessments 
will be flawed because control will be found to rest with other factors rather 
than the actor. 
 
 He sees four ways in which situations can be subject to luck142.  The 
first he calls constitutive luck, by which he means the actor’s personality, 
including his inclinations, moods and capacity.  This is followed by luck 
which arises from the types of circumstances, problems or situations faced, 
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luck in the way the actor had been shaped by earlier circumstances, and 
finally luck in the way the chosen course of action turns out.  It is this final 
category which he chooses to examine first, and it should be remembered that 
here, luck can equally be good or bad.  In this category Nagel would include 
such cases as a lorry driver who accidentally runs over a child.  Here, if he has 
been even slightly negligent in checking his brakes, the situation will become 
one of moral bad luck, for the negligently maintained brakes will remain 
constant while the factor of a child in the road causing sudden, heavy braking 
is something over which the driver has no control143.  The same holds as the 
degrees of negligence rise; if a driver is well over the limit and swerves onto 
the pavement with no unfortunate results, he may count himself lucky that 
there were no pedestrians in the vicinity.  Had someone been walking down 
the pavement and been injured or killed, he would have been liable for those 
results, yet the difference between these cases is purely attributable to the 
element of luck involved.  This luck is determinant of whether the actor and 
society judge him morally accountable for reckless drunken driving, or for 
culpable homicide in situations where the intended actions of the actor were 
the same.  Thus the degree of his culpability comes to depend on matters 
wholly outwith his control144.  If the situation is one where the 
appropriateness of the decision taken is uncertain, Nagel feels it must be 
tempting to see it as irreproachable given what was known at the time no 
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matter how things may turn out145.  However, he disagrees with this; when 
someone makes a decision in this type of situation (one of his examples is 
Chamberlain’s decision to sign the Münich agreement) he takes his ‘moral 
position’ in to his own hands because the way things will turn out will 
determine the character of his earlier decision146.  It is possible to assess 
morally the decision in the light of what was known at the time, but this 
gives, he feels, less than the whole picture.   
 
If Hitler had not overrun Europe and exterminated millions, but 
instead had died of a heart attack after occupying the 
Sudetenland, Chamberlain’s action at Münich would still have 
utterly betrayed the Czechs, but it would not be the great moral 
disaster that has made his name a household word.147 
 
However Nagel concedes that it is sometimes difficult to foresee the outcome 
clearly; the decision can be assessed in one way before the event, but another 
interpretation must wait for the events to unroll themselves first because they 
will determine the colour of the actions.   
 
The same degree of culpability...in intention, motive, or concern 
is compatible with a wide range of judgements, positive or 
negative, depending on what happened beyond the point of 
decision148. 
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 Further, he denies that these judgements are the expression of a 
fleetingly held attitude, rather seeing them as genuine  moral judgements.  He 
takes this from the fact that we can say in advance how the moral judgement 
of the decision will depend on the results149.  His example is as follows; if a 
parent leaves the bath taps running with the baby in the bath, they will realise 
as they rush for the bathroom that if the baby has drowned, they will have 
done something dreadful, whereas if the baby is as still alive, at most they 
will have been careless150.  This hypothetical prior judgement can be made as 
easily by an observer as by the actor.  Nagel admits that for those who see 
responsibility as a facet of control, “all this seems absurd”151 - how can the 
degree of culpability depend on whether or not a child gets in the path of the 
car? It requires that actors are held responsible for both their own actions and 
any interventions of fate. 
 
If the object of moral judgement is the person, then to hold him 
accountable for what he has done in the broader sense is akin to 
strict liability, which may have its legal uses but seems irrational 
as a moral position.152 
 
He notes that the trend is very much to minimise the scope of moral 
assessment. 
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 He then returns to another area where luck may play a role in 
determining the result.  This arises from the variety of personality traits which 
can be found within the human character.  From a Kantian perspective these 
are morally irrelevant, but it is clear that in everyday life, people are assessed 
on such qualities even though they are not under conscious control.  
Intuitively we assess people by looking at what they are like153.  A further 
category is that of luck in the circumstances of a situation.  This arises where a 
person could be found to be cowardly or heroic in a given situation, but if the 
situation never arises, he will never have the chance to earn approbation or 
opprobrium, and thus his moral standing will not be altered, to either good or 
bad154.  Whether he is judged to have behaved well or badly depends solely 
on whether the situation in question arises, which in turn depends on chance.  
Overall his conclusion seems to be that, although the concept of moral luck is 
complex, it cannot be ignored because we do not judge ourselves or others 
solely on the basis of the acts we have performed.  A wide range of external 
influences that bear on actions and determine the course of events must also 
be brought into consideration. 
 
 With this more general approach questions of luck, it is now time to 
turn to considerations of luck in relation to attempts.  This has been discussed 
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by Feinberg at some length155.  His primary question is whether the 
completed crime and the unsuccessful attempt should be punished alike156.  
As is common in such discussions, he furnishes the reader with two almost 
identical hypothetical situations157.  A1 has formulated the intention of 
killing B1 and, with a view to doing so, aims and pulls the trigger.  His actions 
have their intended results and B1 dies from the bullet.  The second situation 
involves A2 and B2, both of whom stand in the same relation to eachother as 
A1 and B1.  A2 has the same motivation and intention to kill as did A1 and is 
thus in a morally equivalent position.  The important difference between the 
two versions lies in the fact that B2 somehow escapes death (he is often 
imagined to have fortuitously worn a bullet-proof vest, or A2 is supposed to 
have mis-fired due to an involuntary movement on his part).  The 
consequences visited upon the two actors now differ wildly - A1 is guilty of 
murder and subject to the severest of penalties, whereas A2 is merely guilty of 
attempted murder.  Feinberg views the actors as morally equally 
blameworthy in respect of the same criminal acts, and thus feels that the 
difference in sentence applied to them shows that the legal system concerned 
does not uphold the principle of proportionality.  The severity of the 
punishment is not in proportion to the blameworthiness of the actor.  To him 
it seems that the difference in sentence between the two actors depends 
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wholly on luck, rather than on their deserts158.  Since A2 did not chose either 
of the imagined life-saving factors, surely he cannot be given any credit for 
B2’s survival.  Feinberg sees it as of pre-eminent importance that arbitrariness 
is removed from the decision since the potential severity of the punishment is 
so great.  He sees the use of criteria which depend on luck, or reliance on 
factors which were neither foreseen nor within the control of the actor as an 
invitation to arbitrariness159.  “Arbitrariness is to a legal system what 
corrosive rust is to machinery”160.  In his opinion, this is sufficient reason to 
support the theory which subjects completed crimes and attempts to the same 
level of punishment, all else being equal.  However he does note that this flies 
in the face of almost world-wide practice. 
 
 His proposal begins by removing the requirement of a caused result 
from the definition of the complete version of crimes.  Thus there would be no 
need for death to result from the criminal acts in order to found a conviction 
for what was previously termed murder.  In order to avoid the linguistic 
oddity of saying that someone had been murdered although they were still 
alive, he envisages a new term - wrongful homicidal behaviour (WHB) - to 
cover situations previously labelled as murder, but without the requirement 
that a death occur.  This would also remove the distinction between murder 
and attempted murder, as all situations would be covered by the wider WHB, 
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or be deemed legally irrelevant161.  “The important advantage of this change 
would be that luck factors would be purged from the sentencing 
guidelines”162.  He envisages that distinctions in sentencing would then be 
made on the basis of the degree of culpability involved rather than the 
existing criterion of completeness of the criminal purpose163. 
 
 He then progresses to some of the arguments which have been put 
forward against this case for reform.  The first of these he takes from LeFave 
and Scott and it has as its basis the conception of crime as a harm which the 
law exists to prevent.  If there is no harm, equally there is no crime.  This 
Feinberg sees as a manifestation of a liberal approach to the acceptable limits 
of the law, with which he has no quarrel.  However he does disagree that 
attempts to commit very harmful crimes should be categorised as harmless 
and so beyond the scope of the criminal law164.  Other opponents try to 
argue that if the actor has caused more harm, then he should be made to pay a 
higher price.  However Feinberg criticises this as applicable  
 
...only in the law of torts where we are adding up amounts so 
that we can present a bill to the harm-causer, not trying to assess 
the exact character of her moral desert165. 
 
 
                                                          
161 ibid., pp119-120. 
162 ibid., p120. 
163 ibid., pp120-1. 
164 ibid., pp122-3. 
165 ibid., p123. 
 Beyond these two arguments which he sees as less than convincing, he 
acknowledges the existence of more cogent arguments.  One of these takes as 
a salient feature the world-wide acceptance of lesser punishment for attempts 
and evidence that most of the adult population agree with this approach, 
which is important in a democracy in order to avoid the charge of 
tyranny166.  However, Feinberg’s criticism of this attitude is clear. 
                                                          
 
That the bulk of people believe that a particular proposition is 
true is a good reason, I agree, for tolerance and respect.  But it is 
not a good reason, even in a democracy, for believing that 
proposition to be true.167 
 
In summary he sees his own approach as, at least initially, highly plausible in 
that the sentencing of the attempter falls within the overall guidelines of the 
principle of proportionality168.  This approach relies on the criterion of 
blameworthiness rather than the traditional approach which assesses the 
amount of harm caused and thus avoids the trap into which the traditional 
theory falls, that being the supposed relevance of factors based purely on 
chance.  The ‘modesty’ of his proposal may be in doubt, but his argument has 
attracted further comment. 
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 Herman considers Feinberg’s proposals with particular emphasis on 
the discussion of attempts169.  She feels that it may well be appropriate to 
maintain a separate approach to the problem of attempts, since there are 
many other types of attempt which do not conform to the pattern of the 
shooting cases170.  These cases have been constructed deliberately to 
maintain every aspect exactly the same except for the result.  Every aspect 
over which the agent could exercise control is mirrored across the two 
situations so the only difference that can arise is in the result as caused by 
something exterior to the actor.  For a Kantian, the moral worth of an action is 
to be found in the agent’s motive and intention and so where these agent-
related aspects are the same, the actions must also equate one to another, at 
least at a moral level.  However in most cases of attempt, the situation is much 
more complicated and all factors depending on the actor are rarely held 
absolutely constant.   
 
 She constructs her own hypothetical situation to show the greater 
complexity of attempt situations.  A number of people set off the climb a 
mountain.  D reaches the summit whereas A, B and C all turn back; A because 
his water supply runs out, B hurts his foot and C has an allergic reaction.  E 
had a phone call just as he was about to join them and was thus prevented 
from setting out.  Who, she asks, has attempted to climb the mountain? 
Clearly, there is more depth to cases of attempt than is presupposed by the 
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shooting cases171.  Feinberg’s argument relies on the moral arbitrariness of 
what distinguishes an attempt from a complete crime, and uses this as the 
reason for treating both alike.  However, as Herman notes, if (as seems the 
case) there are other types of attempt beyond the shooting cases he uses, then 
it is conceivable that what distinguishes attempts from complete crime is 
more morally complex and may therefore be worth preserving172.  She also 
criticises the argument that it is luck which makes the distinction between 
attempts and complete crimes arbitrary.  “That the success of our actions is 
contingent on factors outside our control is too general a fact to explain 
anything”173.  We do not always have greater control over our own actions 
than we do over outside forces.  For example, she feels significantly more 
confident that her computer will perform the tasks required of it than that she 
will find the discipline to concentrate on her writing174. 
 
Whether or not the world coooperates in our efforts is out of our 
control, but it is not a matter of luck...It is an ordinary component 
of rational agency that we act on the assumption that things are 
as they seem...Because it is reasonable to trust that normal actions 
will not misfire, we are not lucky when they succeed, even 
though, as we know, there may be a littered field of “almost 
mishaps” in our wake.175 
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Theoretical Approaches to Inchoate Crime 
 
 With regard to the arguments used to justify the practice of punishing 
incitement, conspiracy and attempt, it seems clear that the more favoured 
approach is utilitarian rather than retributive.  A retributive approach would 
encompass a retrospective point of view which looked for the repayment of a 
debt the criminal owes to society, whilst ensuring that he is not used as a 
means to a further end.  Does a retributive justification of punishment cater 
for the inchoate offences? The overall point to note about retribution is that it 
is retrospective in nature; it looks back to see what has been done.  Clearly, in 
all three inchoate offences this will often amount to precious little; incitement 
requires solicitation, encouragement or instigation of another person to 
commit an offence, conspiracy requires the agreement of two or more persons 
intending to commit a crime and attempts require the actor to have moved 
beyond preparations to acts which can amount to perpetration.  Hence, 
potentially, there will be very little to look back to, although clearly more in 
an attempt than in incitement.  Oldest versions of the retributive approach 
take a talionic form (an eye for an eye).  This is unsuitable for the vast 
majority of cases of inchoate crime since there will often be very little for the 
victim to replicate in order to exact revenge.   
 
 However, retribution is also often conceived of in terms of the 
repayment of a debt owed to society by the offender.  Here ‘debt’ has to be 
seen more in the nature of harm which needs to be requited.  In cases of 
incitement it may be possible to argue that there is harm inherent in the effort 
made to turn another person to crime.  Likewise in conspiracy it could be 
argued that the harm lies in setting the scenario for criminal conduct, 
although since neither offence requires the actual commission of a crime, the 
paradigm of ‘harm’ (the criminal act) is absent.  In the case of attempts, the 
argument is stronger since what is required are acts which are more than 
merely preparatory to the commission of the crime.  Hence, even though the 
harm inherent in the full crime will not arise, there may be harm occasioned 
by these acts.  On this interpretation of retribution, the justificatory argument 
is strongest for attempts, but it remains an unconvincing approach.  In the 
light of this, it would seem better to construct a justification which would 
apply to the punishment of all three offences in order to maintain their 
respective positions as three parts of an intrinsic whole. 
 
 A utilitarian justification for the punishment of inchoate crime would, 
unlike retributivism, be forward-looking.  Its aim is to reduce the incidence of 
crime, to which end a number of approaches are used.  These include 
deterrence, rehabilitation, social protection and denunciation.  Of these, 
deterrence is the most favoured option.  It can certainly be argued that 
punishment of the criminal for incitement and conspiracy may deter him and 
others from similar courses of action in the future.  Whether this result is 
actually achieved is questionable in the light of crime statistics, but there is no 
reason why there should not be at least some deterrent effect in punishing 
these two crimes.  The deterrent effect created by the punishment of attempts 
is clearer since the offender has generally come much closer to commission of 
his crime, and will therefore be more sensitive to the possible repercussions of 
conviction.  Likewise it will give others who may have thought of emulating 
him a salutary lesson.  Again statistics tend to show that deterrence is not 
always as effective as the authorities would like it to be, but it is clear from 
both public opinion and the language of the courts that attempts are punished 
in order to prevent both repetition and imitation.  Thus in practice, the 
justification that is used for the punishment of attempts is both general and 
individual deterrence.  This will however not find favour with Kantian 
retributivists who will see it is an example of the actor being used as a means 
to the further end of social peace.  Rehabilitation in all its forms is relatively 
unpopular in current opinion and its efficacy is rather controversial, all of 
which leads to the conclusion that it is perhaps not the best theory on which 
to found a justification for punishment.  As for arguments based on the need 
for social protection, these are more suited to one aspect of conspiracy than 
either of the other crimes in question.  In incitement and attempt, it is not 
clear why society as a whole really needs to be protected from the criminal; 
neither inciter nor attempter is likely to embark on a campaign of mass 
incitement or attempt a crime on a daily basis.  However, social protection 
does suit the group-conduct aspect of conspiracy as a justification for its 
punishment.  Clearly a group represents a greater source of danger and 
greater potential for success than individuals, and thus it is often used as  a 
political offence in order to control, limit or eradicate group activities.  This 
argument is strong, but again only really suits one aspect of one of the three 
offences. 
 
 How then are we to justify the punishment of inchoate crimes? It 
would be desirable to find a theory which will cover all three in order to 
maintain some sense of homogeneity.  Perhaps the best approach, in the light 
of this, is the deterrence theory; retributivists will always criticise this 
approach but it is clearly the one used in practice and is also alone in applying 
in a relatively strong form to all three crimes.  The aim is to catch conduct 
before it becomes dangerous and prevent future repetition of that behaviour 
by the offender or anyone else.  At a practical level, whether or not criminals 
are actually deterred by the prospect of punishment, and whether it could be 
employed more effectively are both issues beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Clearly the theory works best for attempts, which are the most ‘complete’ of 
the three crimes, but it is important that it also covers conspiracy and 
incitement.  The deterrence theory does this with a greater degree of success 
than any of the other theories discussed. 
 
 
